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Conclusion

Change is the Only Constant1
Because of the nature of mine-action organizations and programs, they are often placed
in post-conflict areas where humanitarian work faces several obstacles. It is important to
consider possible setbacks before embarking on demining in a post-conflict country.
by Zlatko Gegic [ Fondation Suisse de Déminage ]

M

ine action mostly occurs in postconflict and unstable environments. Always a turbulent period
for a country, the post-conflict phase is characterized by abrupt changes and weak government institutions. In addition, a country may
face a sluggish economy, fragile infrastructure,
poverty, high unemployment and political instability, thereby creating a very complex situation for mine-action operations.
A realistic question might be why an organization would consider developing a mine-action
program in such an unstable environment. Several reasons are fairly obvious: to prevent mine
accidents or at least reduce their number; to
provide immediate assistance to victims of explosive remnants of war; to begin building the
foundation for economic and social recovery;
and to provide assistance to and resettlement
for refugees and internally displaced persons.
While one might assume that the governments
of mine-affected countries, having the strongest
interest in mine action, would provide whatever is necessary to execute mine-action activities,
the reality, unfortunately, is often otherwise.
Political Instability

Conditions such as armed clashes2 and insurgencies3 can result in the termination of
activities and mine-action programs. A significant number of disillusioned ex-soldiers and
armed insurgents will often resort to criminal
activities and general banditry.4 Though unilateral support from the host country for humanitarian organizations would provide the
best foundation for mine-action activities,
post-conflict governments are often torn apart
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by rampant political corruption and are unable
to address their country’s issues or provide the
necessary support to those organizations operating in their country. As a result, mine-action
organizations are often left to develop the programs and provide assistance with little or no
cooperation from the local governments.
Logistical Concerns

The challenges mine-action programs face
in complex situations are enormous, including
providing protection for personnel and assets,
complex logistics, restricted movement, continual changes in deployment plans, and obstacles preventing removal of ERW in the field.
These problems are persistent for those working
in countries such as Afghanistan, Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka
and Sudan, to name a few.

Adrien Buhire, an FSD deminer, points to a hole in his truck caused by the bullet that
wounded him during an attack on the FSD convoy in Burundi (March 2008).
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a few indifferent, poorly equipped
and unpaid police officers provided
as armed escorts. Furthermore, the
police officers were suddenly withdrawn when the local government
felt their assistance was required
elsewhere. Nevertheless, tasks need
to be completed and deadlines met.
While mine-action organizations
may be able to afford these additional short-term burdens on their budgets and staff, these programs can
rarely afford to provide such substantial assistance for extended periods of time.

Economic Difficulties

Despite post-conflict government declaratives and a genuine enthusiasm to assist with
mine-action activities, many governments do
not have the financial or organizational ability to assist with mine-action operations. This
limitation often puts a strain on the finances of
mine-action organizations operating in postconflict countries. Organizations may find they
are unable to access task sites, and that their
field staff need additional protection, usually in
a form of an armed escort. However, the organizations usually have to endure all costs related to this protection, such as fuel, food, daily
wages and transport. In the case of Fondation
Suisse de Déminage program in Burundi, assistance the authorities offered was in the form of

Additional Considerations

Mine-action organizations must
juggle the program’s goals and the
donor’s requirements with the reality of the situation on the ground.
Program strategies, especially proposals for mine-action activities,
are written assuming the work will
be carried out in a relatively stable situation and are often based
on the assumption of minimum
costs, sometimes with unrealistic
goals, deadlines and financial requirements, in order to win a bid or
secure funding. In addition to bureaucratic issues, mine-action organiza-

tions must take a country’s specific
security issues and insurgency constraints, as well as the ethnic and religious background of national staff,
into consideration.
In teams of mixed nationalities,
organizations will face challenges
regarding supervisory issues. For
example, organizations must consider the implications of sending
mine-action teams composed primarily of Muslims to work in a Serbian
(Christian)-dominated area in BosniaHerzegovina, or Shiites and Sunnis to
work in religious conflict zones in
Iraq. Additional limiting factors include the restrictions placed by donors on the use of funds, the type of
intervention used (mine-risk education versus ERW clearance), and the
prioritization of mine-action tasks.
This prioritization is especially limiting when United Nations Mine
Action Centers cater to the host
country’s wishes, often overlooking
humanitarian mine-action interests, and when the corruption and
ethical structure of national mineaction authorities manipulate task
prioritization on the basis of ethnic
bias, further exacerbating an already
difficult situation.

Post-conflict areas are generally unstable and require mine action to help return to normalcy. One
can be certain that sudden, unpredictable changes are the only constants in this industry. The only way
to help an organization cope with
these complex situations is to carefully perform a pre-program analysis that sets realistic goals, deadlines
and methods of evaluation. Furthermore, in choosing individuals with
experience managing mine-action
activities in post-conflict environments, organizations can increase
the success of a mine-action program. Ultimately, organizations must
learn to consider the lack of host-government support coupled with sudden and unpredictable change and
work to avert these pitfalls, thereby
helping to ensure the effective transition from a post-conflict situation
to one of stability and safety.
See Endnotes, Page 77
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